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Gregory J. Till 
Senior Thesis 
A Chaotic Approach to Free Will and Determinism 
I. Introduction 
The debate over free will and determinism presents itself as 
perhaps the central and most vexing problem in Western 
philosophy. This problem can be expressed in a single sentence: 
We feel we have freedom in our ability to make reasoned 
decisions, yet this freedom is contradicted by the belief that 
every event has a cause, implying that our actions are not free 
but are determined. This contradiction led Dr. Samuel Johnson to 
sum up the problem with his slogan-like statement that "All 
theory is against freedom of the will, all experience is for it" 
{Kenny, 1). 
This problem has an impact on the way we view the behavior 
of others. Do we act with freedom or is freedom simply an 
illusion? Furthermore, if it is an illusion, should we be 
thought of as and held responsible for our actions? The 
importance and difficulty of this debate are suggested in the 
problems the sciences of human action have had in placing 
responsibility for actions. 
This paper approaches this ancient problem by incorporating 
the new science of chaos. Chaos is the name given to the 
discovery that even "simple deterministic systems with only a few 
elements can generate random behavior" {Crutchfield et al., 46). 
Chaos shows that deterministic systems can act in ways which are 
not predictable while at the same time showing that many 
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seemingly random phenomena are more explainable than once 
thought. By doing so, chaos alters the laws of causation upon 
which much of this debate rests and indicates that perhaps not 
all theory is against freedom of the will, despite Dr. Johnson's 
statement to the contrary. 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that while chaos 
improves the case for determinism, it also shows that free will 
might be possible in a world that otherwise appears to be 
governed by universal efficient causality. In showing this, the 
paper is broken down into five sections, the first being this 
introduction. The second section reviews the free will and 
determinism debate to establish a context for the conclusions and 
to develop criteria for the advancement of each argument. The 
third section reviews the science of chaos to establish how it 
may theoretically meet these criteria and to show how chaos may 
be detected in behavior. After that, specific evidence of the 
link between chaos and behavior is sought, and in the fifth 
section, final conclusions are drawn from this evidence to 
fulfill the thesis. 
II. The Free Will and Determinism Debate 
As just mentioned, this section will review the free will 
and determinism argument for the dual purposes of developing a 
framework for the conclusions and establishing criteria for the 
strengthening of both arguments. The two arguments are dealt 
with separately in some detail to establish these criteria. In 
breaking down the arguments, the philosophical beliefs will be 
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introduced first, followed by the scientific grounds for those 
beliefs. As the grounds for the respective beliefs are examined, 
the particular criteria which must be met for each belief to be 
strengthened will become clear. 
Determinism is the thesis that every event is the effect of 
an antecedent cause (Pujmon, 397), also known as the thesis of 
universal efficient causality. Since human actions are events, 
they must be governed by these causal laws as well. Our actions 
are therefore determined and the belief that we have control over 
our actions is illusory. Free will is fiction in the 
deterministic model, since our actions result not from it but 
from the laws of causality. In the words of Baron d' Holbach, 
"Thus it must appear, that where all the causes are linked one to 
the other, where the whole forms but one immense chain, there 
cannot be any independent, any isolated energy; any detached 
power" (1: 41). 
Although free will does not exist in the deterministic 
model, this is not necessarily the case with respect to the 
concept of freedom. Philosophical differences over freedom split 
determinism into two separate beliefs. These philosophical 
differences over freedom can be outlined by the respective ways 
they make sense of the statement, "The individual could have done 
otherwise." The two deterministic meanings for this statement 
are known as hard determinism and compatibilism. 
The deterministic argument known as hard determinism denies 
that an individual could do otherwise, meaning that our belief in 
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freedom is false. The laws of causation dictate that everything 
which has happened, had to happen. As a result, our belief that 
for any event we could have done otherwise is unreal, and freedom 
does not exist. 
Without the freedom to choose our actions, we cannot place 
responsibility for those actions, and without responsibility we 
cannot have morality. Despite this, hard determinism is not 
without support. For instance, it provides a psychologically 
powerful reason for religious belief, since faithful individuals 
whose lives are unpleasant and seem beyond their control can hope 
that there is a "master plan" in store for them by an omnipotent 
being. 
A famous proponent of hard determinism was attorney Clarence 
Darrow. Darrow stated his belief in a "human machine" determined 
completely by heredity and environment (32). He believed that 
since our actions are determined we are not free, and that this 
absence of freedom means that we should not be held responsible 
for our actions (31). His passionate statement of hard 
determinism was crucial to his well-known defense of the 
murderers Leopold and Loeb, and he succeeded in his attempts to 
stave off the boys' execution. 
Nevertheless, without the freedom to choose our actions, we 
cannot place responsibility for those actions, and without 
responsibility we cannot have morality. This denial of freedom 
and its consequences leads many to turn away from hard 
determinism in favor of compatibilism. Since hard determinism is 
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not a widely accepted view, it will not be explicitly handled in 
this paper. Instead, compatibilism will receive most of the 
attention given to determinism. 
Compatibilism, or soft determinism, provides a second and 
more subtle answer to the question of freedom. The 
compatibilists realize the need to bring morality back into 
determinism and so argue that the statement "The individual could 
have done otherwise," does not refer to freedom from causal laws 
but to the ability to act without coercion from others. For 
instance, a person who decides to give a dollar to charity is 
acting with freedom; a child who feels he has no option but to 
give a dollar to the bully to prevent a beating is acting without 
freedom. 
This interpretation of freedom relies upon a distinction 
between voluntary acts which are free from coercion and the laws 
of causation which may ultimately determine those actions. The 
compatibilists understand our need for freedom and argue that the 
causal processes which determine our actions are so far removed 
from our experience of behavior that we do not apply physical 
causal explanations to them (Bertalonffy, 221). For instance, we 
tend to explain actions in term of thoughts, impulses, or 
emotions rather than by unbreakable causal laws. By explaining 
actions in terms of motives, the laws of causality are bypassed 
and freedom is allowed. 
Another way of explaining the difference is by separating 
statements of truth into those which are ultimately true and 
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those which are conventionally true. Ultimate truths are facts; 
they are beliefs which agree with the world as our minds must 
experience it. They are not true merely by arbitrary agreement 
but are more scientific in nature. They are truths which await 
our discovery, rather than our invention. The universality of 
the laws of causality has been held to be such a truth. 
Conventional truths, on the other hand, are true only by 
consensus. They are agreed upon abstractions or terms which are 
useful for our existence but have no truth value in themselves at 
an ultimate level. For the Western tradition of morality, 
freedom has been one such conventional truth. It is conventional 
rather than ultimate because science does not show that freedom 
exists on a physical, scientific level. Instead, it is an 
abstraction, agreed upon only by convention, which is useful in 
effecting the actions of others by giving rise to responsibility 
and morality. 
Compatibilists can argue that the contradiction between 
freedom and determinism arises when we fail to distinguish 
between the two levels of truth. If we attempt to equate 
ultimate truths with conventional truths, we lose all 
abstractions, including freedom. However, since science must 
also show it to be an ultimate truth that we have a need for 
abstractions, the two levels of truth must be kept separate. 
Thus, we can accept the conventional truth that we are free, even 
if ultimately our actions are determined (Sidertis, 158). 
Since compatibilism allows for freedom, morality can still 
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exist. But since freedom exists only by convention, moral 
standards are not considered to be absolute and utilitarianism is 
the norm. Rewards and punishments for actions are generally 
viewed in light of their effectiveness as incentives and 
deterrents to future behavior (Pojmon, 414). Such a view is 
advanced by Ted Honderich in his essay "One determinism," where 
he argues that people should be held responsible for their 
actions even if they cannot be responsible in an ultimate sense, 
stating that "a man is responsible for an action if his future 
behavior can be affected by punishment" (206). 
Compatibilism has been criticized for wanting it both way~. 
Critics argue that we cannot be both free and determined; the two 
are incompatible. Despite this, determinism has some strong 
scientific grounds for its adoption. Having reviewed the 
philosophical aspects of determinism argument, its scientific 
basis will now be outlined in greater detail to ascertain in what 
ways it could be improved. 
Although the debate over free will and determinism goes back 
to the early Greeks, the scientific basis of modern determinism 
rests primarily upon the work of Newton. Newton's work 
substantially strengthened determinism, so much so that Newtonian 
laws have often been put at the level of ultimate truth. Newton 
seemingly showed conclusively that the universe is governed by 
laws of efficient causality. He made the movement of bodies 
describable solely in terms of physical and mathematical laws 
that denied the possibility of any kind of causality outside of 
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efficient causality, precluding the existence of free will. The 
ability to use these laws to predict the behavior of bodies gave 
great strength to Newton's work. 
This Newtonian conviction in prediction was stated in its 
classic form by the French mathematician Pierre Simon de LaPlace: 
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as 
the effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the 
state which is to follow. Given for one instant an 
intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which 
nature is animated and the respective situation of the 
beings who compose it - an intelligence sufficiently vast to 
submit these data to analysis - it would embrace in one 
single formula the movements of the greatest bodies and 
those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be 
uncertain and the future, as well as the past, would be 
present to its eyes (4). 
Theoretical predictability has long been part of the 
deterministic model. 
I emphasize that all actions have been considered 
theoretically predictable since for practical reasons the 
computation required for such a high level of precision in 
prediction would require far more information than any computer 
could handle. Still, the old model holds that the general laws 
which determine our behavior are knowable, and that these laws 
would allow fairly accurate predictions to be made from fairly 
accurate data. Newtonian determinism has hoped to at least come 
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close to predicting behavior. 
The Newtonian revolution made the world describable in 
mathematical terms that seemingly eliminated the role of purpose 
in the causation of events, preventing the possibility of free 
will. Likewise, by establishing the atomic theory as a 
foundation of empirical science, Newton helped us redefine 
ourselves as molecular people. As a result of being defined in 
purely physical terms, we are describable through Newtonian 
determinism, which means our behavior is theoretically 
understandable and predictable. An example of this is given in 
Mindwatching, a 1983 book by Hans J. and Michael Eysenck. The 
authors state, "What do psychologists hope to learn from their 
study of behavior? Ultimately, the goal is to understand why 
people behave as they do, so that it will be possible to predict 
and change their behavior" (1). Proving predictability in human 
behavior continues to be a major goal of science. 
The problem, ho~ever, is that the sciences cannot claim that 
this goal has been achieved. The conclusion that we are governed 
solely by physical laws would be aided considerably if this could 
be done, but human beings stubbornly resist attempts to show that 
our actions are knowable in advance. This forces the 
determinists into the embarrassing admission of unpredictability 
in their model, which they excuse by saying that universal laws 
of human behavior do exist but we do not yet have enough 
information to establish them. This unpredictability has been 
seized upon by some as indirect evidence of the action of the 
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contra-causal free will. 
The difficulties with predictability are seen in one of the 
strongest forms of scientific determinism, neurophysiological 
determinism. It has been described well by Ted Honderich. The 
strength of this particular brand of determinism lies in its 
simplicity, since it can be described in three sentences. 
"States of the brain are, in the first place, effects, the 
effects of other physical states. Many states of the brain, 
secondly, are correlates [to mental states] .. Some states 
of the brain, thirdly, are causes, both of other states of the 
brain and also of certain movement's of one's body" (187). 
Looking at Honderich's description in reverse order, three 
things should be observed. First of all, Honderich's statement 
that brain states determine our actions will not be contested. 
Honderich is simply stating that the physical processes which 
lead to our actions begin in the brain, and the evidence for this 
is so overwhelming and intuitive that it will not even be 
described. This claim seems on the mark. 
Secondly, Honderich does not insist that our mental states 
are caused by the physical states of the brain, since it not 
necessary to do so while still defending determinism. Mental 
events are a by-product, if that, to brain states in 
neurophysiological determinism. By not trying to explain mental 
events, the deterministic argument is streamlined in that 
psychologists do not have to be able to explain actions through 
mental processes for determinism to be true. 
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Thirdly, and most importantly, Honderich's statement that 
brain states are determined by physical states is meant to 
establish a deterministic way of explaining our behavior. 
Nevertheless, he admits that causal laws showing how brain states 
are caused by physical states are lacking. "We do not know what 
specific connexions hold between physical states and brain states 
that are correlated with very specific higher mental events, such 
events as noticing the date or speculating that America is a 
plutocracy" (195). Obviously, if physical laws have not been 
established then prediction is impossible. 
Since neurophysiological determinism cannot establish how 
brain states are determined Honderich cannot rule out the 
possibility of overdetermination, though he is "most 
uncomfortable" with the prospect (197). Overdetermination is the 
thesis that while causal laws may work in the physical world, 
physical processes can also be influenced by non-physical 
entities such as free will. overdetermination is important to 
the free will argument and shall be examined further in the 
context of that argument. 
It has been seen that unpredictability untracks attempts to 
complete the deterministic model, and this gives room for the 
claim of free will. If the determinists could show that causal 
laws alone could explain this unpredictability, it would enhance 
determinism and impair libertarianism. Therefore, a successful 
attempt to do so should be the criterion for judging the 
effectiveness of chaos in improving the deterministic model. 
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Having shown this, I shall turn to the libertarian argument. 
The libertarian or free will argument advocates the 
existence of a free will which acts as a first or uncaused cause 
of our actions. The libertarians agree with the hard 
determinists in their critique of compatibilism; the soft 
determinists are leading a false double life by believing that 
freedom and causality are compatible. Therefore, we need the 
action of a free will to break the contradiction between freedom 
and determinism, for the free will does not act out of efficient 
causality. Instead, it acts with final causality, or with 
purpose. 
The libertarians also differ with the compatibilists as to 
the meaning of freedom. The libertarians argue that the 
compatibilists' "freedom from coercion" does not really fit our 
traditional definition of freedom. The libertarian 
interpretation of freedom is seen in their analysis of the 
sentence "I could have done otherwise." The libertarians claim 
that in order for an individual to really do otherwise, the 
individual must have the ability to get beyond the binding laws 
of universal causality. It is only then that the individual has 
"true" freedom. 
As opposed to the compatibilist "freedom from coercion," the 
libertarian version of freedom is known as ''freedom of 
contingency." Libertarian freedom is defined as freedom from 
physical causality, not merely by the absence of intimidation 
from others. The libertarians do not make the distinction 
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between conventional and ultimate truths that the determinists 
do; accordingly, they argue that if we believe our actions to be 
determined by causal laws, we are not free. 
To avoid this problem, the libertarians propose the 
existence of a free will which makes our actions contingent. 
Actions may or may not happen, as opposed to having to happen, 
which is the case in the deterministic model. The libertarians 
argue that this contingency is necessary for the statement "The 
individual could have done otherwise" to agree with our 
traditional definition of freedom. Unlike compatibilism, this 
definition of freedom allows us to believe others are truly 
responsible for their actions, and that in turn presents a richer 
picture of morality. 
The ability of free will to produce this type of freedom is 
described by Immanuel Kant, whose analysis of the debate I have 
found somewhat useful in defining the libertarian argument. "As 
will is a kind of causality of living beings so far as they are 
rational, freedom would be that property of this causality by 
which it can be effective independent of foreign causes 
determining it," (FMM 446) . 1 The intelligible character of free 
will has a causality which ''is determining, not determined," thus 
avoiding efficient causality and giving us true freedom (CPR 
1Abbreviation for Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
taken from Kant Selections. 
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A556/B584). 2 The action of the free will is describable only in 
terms of purpose, or final causality. 
How the free will is capable of such a causality is not 
explored in this paper. Arguably, any attempts to answer such a 
question are futile, for the free will cannot be directly 
examined by science. As a result, I will concentrate on showing 
how free will may be possible and on proposing the ways in which 
it may legitimately effect our behavior. This mirrors the words 
of Kant, who says "that nature does not contradict the causality 
of freedom, was the only thing we could prove, or care to prove" 
(CPR, A557/B586). I will stick to developing a scientific 
criterion for the strengthening of the libertarian argument, and 
not go beyond that. 
In attempting to establish the possibility of free will, the 
libertarians are forced to critique the deterministic argument. 
While determinism uses scientific evidence to develop its 
philosophical arguments, libertarianism goes in the opposite 
direction. Libertarianism uses its philosophical belief that 
freedom from causal laws is necessary for morality as a central 
truth, and then looks for scientific reasons to allow for this 
possibility. As a result, it is necessary to attack the 
deterministic belief in universal efficient causality to make 
room for the possibility of free will. 
The first move in accomplishing this is to assail the notion 
2Abbreviation for Critique of Pure Reason. All references 
to this work are taken from Kant Selections, save one (pp. 15-16 
of text). 
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of ultimate truth, or at least our access to it, for the notion 
that we have ultimate truths has already been shown to be harmful 
to the libertarian argument. Two different routes to achieving 
this are open. Immanuel Kant and Thomas Kuhn both provide 
separate ways of damaging the argument that we have direct access 
to ultimate truths. 
Kant gives one answer to the question of universal efficient 
causality that explains our seemingly instinctive belief in it as 
an ultimate truth while allowing for the possibility of free 
will. Kant argues that causality is created by the mind to give 
structure to our sensory experiences. In this sense, efficient 
causality is an ultimate truth, at least as far as we capable of 
knowing; however, our senses are limited and we cannot experience 
things-in-themselves (noumena), only our sensory images of them 
(phenomena). (Form and Principles, sect. II: 392) • 3 Our access 
to ultimate truths is limited by our senses. The limits upon our 
sensory abilities presents the possibility that libertarian 
freedom exists in the noumenal world but cannot be directly 
experienced as a phenomenon. 
While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical 
conditions, the intelligible cause [the free will] together 
with its causality, is outside the series. Thus the effect 
may be regarded as free in respect of intelligible cause, 
and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting 
3Abbreviation for On the Form and Principles of the Sensible 
and Intelligible World (The Inaugural Dissertation), taken from 
Kant Selections. 
Till 16 
from them according to necessity (CPR, A537/B565) . 4 
In this way, the appearance of the universality of efficient 
causality can be maintained while in actuality freedom can exist. 
Kant holds out the possibility of some ultimate truths which 
we cannot directly access, and many modern philosophers of 
science go even further by arguing that we cannot access ultimate 
truths at all. This has been asserted most strongly by the 
influential philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn, who argues that 
there is no one way which we must see the world. Instead, this 
process is learned and we cannot say that the facts which we hold 
as ultimately true are so at all, since the process by which we 
experience the world is arbitrary. 
Accordingly, Kuhn claims that scientific study is a form of 
"puzzle solving," settling the questions encountered by any 
paradigm, or set of arbitrary beliefs concerning reality (Kuhn, 
234). Paradigms are judged by their ability to solve the 
internal puzzles that each must face. 
By pushing what have been held as ultimate truths to the 
level of conventional truths the contradiction between freedom 
and determinism is revived, creating an unsolvable puzzle in our 
deterministic paradigm. The libertarians believe this 
contradiction should make us alter our notion of causality. In 
particular, the libertarians argue that our paradigm should be 
4 This quotation from the Critique of Pure Reason is taken 
from Smith's translation. All other references to Kant are taken 
from Kant Selections, which did not contain the segment quoted 
here. 
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changed to allow for something more than efficient causality; 
namely, final causality, the kind that free will would fall 
under. Allowing such a causality would break the apparent 
contradiction between free will and determinism. The inability 
of determinism to prove the free will ultimately false makes this 
possible and necessary. 
Also, libertarians argue that belief in the free will should 
be adopted because it is more useful in effecting the actions of 
others, which is the very purpose of conventional truths. The 
libertarians argue that their meaning of the word freedom best 
fits our traditional use of that word, and compared to the more 
limited compatibilist interpretation it provides a richer view of 
morality. For these reasons, the libertarians argue that its 
existence should simply be presumed unless evidence shows 
otherwise. 
By attacking the notion of our access to ultimate truths, 
Kant and Kuhn make some room for the libertarian argument. 
However, to complete their argument, the libertarians need to 
develop a model of their own which agrees with our experience of 
the world. It is here that the criteria for the improvement of 
the argument will become clear. 
Any attempt to define how the free will can and does act 
must not contradict the beliefs that we have about the world, 
whether those beliefs be ultimately or conventionally true. A 
model of the free will would be much more acceptable if it does 
not directly challenge our experience of the world. It also make 
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the creation of such a model a much more difficult task. Still, 
all that the libertarians need to show is that possibility of 
free will does not contradict our experience of the world, since 
from this its existence can be "read" into our actions. 
One way of establishing this is to attack the idea of 
efficient causality, for the thesis of universal efficient 
causation is not accepted universally. Hume, for instance, was 
harshly critical of the idea of efficient causality and Bertrand 
Russell called for its abandonment altogether (Wright, 3). The 
reason for this is that we cannot actually "prove" or even sense 
efficient causality - it is only a relation between events, where 
the occurrence of the first event is thought to bring about the 
second. By criticizing the idea of efficient causality, the 
possibility is opened that events are produced in other ways, 
such as by overdetermination resulting from the action of the 
free will. 
However, at least the appearance of universal efficient 
causality must be upheld, for it agrees with our experience of 
the world. As a result, the libertarian model must not consider 
the action of the free will to be physically detectable. The 
world at least appears to be governed by causal laws, and since 
the free will cannot be analyzed by science, physical indications 
of the free will must not be available. Such evidence would go 
against our experience of the world and would be proof of the 
free will, both of which seemingly are impossible. Instead, if 
the free will is to act, it can do so only where causality cannot 
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predict behavior, since this would allow it to act without 
detection. 
The model of neurophysiological determinism is useful in 
showing how this may be possible. This model holds that our 
behavior is determined by brain states, and that these brain 
states are determined through causal laws. However, no causal 
laws have been yet established, and this provides the necessary 
room for the libertarians to argue that brain states are 
influenced not only by causal laws, but by the free will through 
the process of overdetermination. 
Accordingly, the deterministic belief that brain states are 
theoretically predictable is harmful to the libertarians, for if 
they are predictable it means that efficient causality alone 
determines brain states and the free will is a vacuous doctrine. 
As a result, for the possibility of overdetermination, our 
seemingly deterministic and predictable world must at least 
sometimes act in ways which are fundamentally unpredictable. It 
is only then that the free will can act, but the possibility of 
this is all that is necessary for the libertarians to claim that 
the existence of the free will should be presumed. 
Fundamental unpredictability in brain states has been shown 
to be necessary for the libertarian concept of overdetermination. 
Showing that this is possible under our deterministic paradigm 
has traditionally been a problem for the libertarians. To 
succeed in this task would greatly aid the libertarian argument. 
A more specific and concrete account of how this 
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overdetermination can take place is the problem to which I now 
turn. 
Attempts to develop a workable theory of overdetermination 
date back to the ancient Greeks. In particular, the writings of 
the Epicurean philosopher Lucretius are informative in this 
regard. The Epicureans believed in an atomic theory slightly 
similar to the one we hold today. In particular, they believed 
that everything consisted of atoms which were smaller than the 
eye could see, and were generally governed by universal laws. 
Lucretius allowed for the ability of the free will to cause these 
atoms to randomly "swerve" in a manner that cannot be perceived, 
thereby altering what would have otherwise happened while not 
overtly breaking the laws of causality. 
For this we see to be manifest and plain, that weights, as 
far as in them lies, cannot travel obliquely, as far as one 
can perceive; but who is there that can perceive that they 
never swerve ever so little from the straight undeviating 
course? 
Again, if all motion is always one long chain, and new 
motion arises out of the old in order invariable, and if the 
first-beginnings do not make by swerving a beginning of 
motion such as to break the decrees of fate, that cause may 
not follow cause from infinity, whence comes this free will 
in living creatures all over the earth, whence I say is this 
will wrestled from the fates by which we proceed whither 
pleasure leads each, swerving also our motions not at fixed 
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times and fixed places, but just where our mind has taken 
us? For undoubtedly it is his own will in each that begins 
these things, and from the will movements go rippling 
through the limbs (lines 247-264). 
This ability of the free will to change the course of the 
atoms is a statement of overdetermination. The free will works 
at an undetectable level to effect a large-scale change in what 
would have otherwise happened had only the laws of causality been 
in effect. This Epicurean Swerve can only be done if some 
deterministic events are fundamentally unpredictable, since the 
free will could then act without breaking the appearance of 
physical causality. Several endeavors have been made to develop 
a modern-day Epicurean Swerve, and they provide additional 
insight into the construction of the libertarian model. 
These attempts have relied upon some of the cracks in the 
pillars of predictable Newtonian science which have developed 
this century. In particular, the Heisenburg Uncertainty 
Principle has been unsettling to classical determinism and it has 
been used by some to justify free will. The Uncertainty 
Principle states that the action of individual particles at the 
subatomic level is indeterminant: the fundamental limits on our 
ability to gather information at this level means we simply 
cannot tell whether or not causal laws apply here. (Crutchfield 
et al., 48). 
For instance, George Prescott Scott attempts to show that 
the free will could act at the quantum level to affect brain 
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states in Atoms of the Living Flame. Scott argued that neurons 
are subject to the influence of quantum indeterminacy, meaning 
that brain states are themselves indeterminant. Thus, universal 
efficient causality is avoided and the possibility of free will 
is open (318). John Thorp makes a similar case in Free Will: A 
Defence Against Neurophysiological Determinism, relying upon 
indeterminacy in the firing of individual neurons in the brain 
(71) • 
Relying upon the Indeterminacy Thesis to establish the 
possibility of free will has two problems. First of all, it 
might be wrong. Einstein was outspoken in his criticism of it, 
declaring that "God does not play dice!'' (Pojmon, 408). The 
discovery of subatomic events is still fairly recent, and 
advances in physics could show that subatomic events are just as 
deterministic as those at the atomic level. Still, indeterminacy 
does seem to be real, since limits upon what we can learn at this 
level do seem to be fundamental. 
Secondly, the effects of indeterminacy seem to be limited to 
the subatomic world. Indeterminant events at the subatomic level 
balance out to allow classical Newtonian physics to operate 
without disturbance (Pool, 893). This is particularly damaging 
to Scott's argument, which holds that subatomic events can 
influence behavior. By the same token, indeterminacy in the 
firing of brain cells can be expected to statistically balance 
out in the whole. Universal causality is maintained, and brain 
states are still thought of as theoretically understandable and 
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even predictable. For this reason, Thorp's argument based upon 
indeterminacy in brain neurons does not seem to be enough to 
escape universal causality. 
Scott and Thorp fail in their arguments because the 
unpredictability they establish is not enough to significantly 
alter brain states. What is needed for the possibility of free 
will is a mechanism which could amplify this indeterminacy into 
having a substantial effect upon brain states, or could act by 
itself to produce unpredictability in brain states. Doing so 
could allow for the undetectable influence of the free will to 
have an effect on our behavior. This is the purpose of 
overdetermination or the Epicurean Swerve. 
The importance of demonstrating that something like an 
Epicurean Swerve is possible is shown in that it would allow an 
explanation of how the free will may effect our actions. 
Especially useful in sketching out this explanation is a recent 
investigation conducted by Dr. Benjamin Libet of the University 
of California at San Francisco. 
Libet's experiments on voluntary action indicate that the 
brain may unconsciously develop options for action but that these 
potential actions must pass through an individual's consciousness 
before the action can take place. Libet theorizes that the free 
will acts during this brief interlude with veto power over 
inclinations to act, stopping some potential actions while 
allowing the realization of others (529). The free will does not 
develop ideas, it simply chooses from them. This answers a 
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possible objection that somehow the free will works upon the mind 
to create potentials for action, which is full of theoretical 
difficulties. 
Instead, the Epicurean Swerve would be used to alter brain 
states, randomly scattering vetoed potential actions into 
oblivion. This works just as effectively as the idea of a free 
will which directs brain states, and also means that the free 
will could act without being detected. Additionally, it explains 
why all animals can have free will but only humans can have 
morality, since we are the only ones who can develop the idea of 
it. 
As the discussion hopefully shows, a way of showing that a 
world seemingly governed by efficient causality can allow for 
fundamental unpredictability is essential for the libertarian 
argument. This would open the possibility that the free will can 
exist, and the libertarians claim that if it is possible then its 
existence should be presumed. Accomplishing this will be the 
criterion for the advancing of the libertarian argument, which I 
will try to show that chaos meets. 
Similarly, the determinists must show that causal laws alone 
can explain the unpredictability of behavior. By doing so, the 
determinists can malign the libertarian belief that 
unpredictability of behavior results from the action of the 
mysterious free will. These criteria are closely related, if not 
identical, and it should not be surprising to find that the 
meeting of one criterion simultaneously meets the other. This 
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should be kept in mind as I turn to a review of chaos, where the 
theoretical groundwork for meeting these criteria will be set 
down. 
III. Chaos 
As mentioned already, chaos is the name used to describe 
deterministic systems which display apparently random behavior. 
Chaos also indicates that some seemingly random behavior is more 
explainable than once thought. Chaos applies to the same 
physical systems that Newton dealt with in establishing the 
modern deterministic model, and so would seem to have some 
theoretical relevance to the larger philosophical discussion. 
This section will review the science of chaos to establish 
how it may theoretically meet the criteria established in the 
last section and to show how chaos can be detected in our 
behavior. More specifically, I will attempt to show in this 
section that chaos works as a double-edged sword in the 
philosophical debate, for it can theoretically be used to back 
the criterion established for both arguments. The ways in which 
it does so are outlined in the first part of this section, which 
reviews chaos and the way it is generated by deterministic 
systems. 
Attempts to substantiate the theoretical conclusions drawn 
at the end of the first part of the section take up the rest of 
the paper, beginning with the second half of this section, which 
reviews the specific ways in which a chaotic system can be 
identified. The importance of identifying chaotic systems will 
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be seen in the next section, which makes a more concrete attempt 
to show that chaos applies to our understanding of behavior. It 
is from this information that the final conclusions will be 
drawn. 
This half of the section will establish how chaos comes 
about and show the theoretical ways in which it encounters the 
free will and determinism debate. Chaos shares with that debate 
an indebtedness to the work of Newton as a foundation for its 
arguments. Newton tried to show that nature is describable in 
purely physical ways. He dissected nature into closed systems 
which could be analyzed independently of each other. 
Specifically, these systems of motion (and equilibrium states) 
are referred to as dynamical systems, and they are mathematically 
describable through differential equations. Differential 
equations are used to deduce future states of a dynamical system 
(Ekeland, 21). 
Newton attempted to describe nature solely through linear 
differential equations, which are solvable and predictable. A 
linear equation is one in which any two solutions added together 
is itself a solution (Stewart, 81). Linear equations can be 
displayed on a graph as a straight line or smooth curve, and 
allow for predictions to be made. For instance, by knowing the 
position and momentum of two objects, it is easy to predict where 
they will go, or if two objects are about to collide, their new 
directions and speeds are predictable. 
Even now, the world is often thought to be describable 
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through linear equations and events believed to be theoretically 
predictable, so great is the influence of Newton. However, this 
deterministic assumption is being shown to be wildly off the 
mark, for non-linear equations play a large role in describing 
nature. Non-linear equations have terms which are multiplied by 
themselves. When displayed on a graph, non-linear equations take 
on much more violent shapes than their linear counterparts. Many 
. 
non-linear equations are unsolvable, and because of this the 
actions of even simple deterministic systems are unpredictable. 
. / 
For example, the French mathematician Henri Poincare showed 
at the turn of this century that when three or more bodies are 
acting upon each other at the same time, the differential 
equation for that system becomes formally unsolvable due to the 
non-linearity of the equation (Ekeland, 36). This unsolvable 
system is known as the "three-body problem." Establishing non-
linearity at such a simple level shows that linear equations do 
not alone best model nature, and implies that the world is 
unpredictable to a significant extent. The unpredictability 
created by many non-linear systems is chaos. 
This unpredictability is produced through a process of 
feedback. In a linear system, errors are magnified 
arithmetically and do not make a large dent in the accuracy of 
predictions. Non-linear systems, on the other hand, amplify 
errors geometrically, since nonlinear equations have terms which 
multiply themselves. Errors are fed back into the equation so 
that they produce even greater errors down the line. It is this 
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feedback which causes chaotic systems to act unpredictably. 
Small errors in initial conditions rapidly "blow up," making 
prediction impossible. 
A striking model of this can be seen within the classical 
model of billiards. Disregarding the supposedly negligible non-
linear effects of friction and gravity, the action of the 
billiard balls is considered to be a closed system and perfectly 
predictable under Newtonian laws. However, when the supposedly 
negligible effects of non-linear variables are included in the 
equation, the paths of the billiard balls quickly becomes 
unworkable. Unless the gravitational pull of electrons at the 
edge of the galaxy is included in the equation, the path of the 
balls is impossible to predict after just one minute! 
(Crutchfield et al., 49). 
In this example, chaos makes its appearance in two ways. 
First of all, the attempt to approximate a non-linear equation 
introduced errors into the setting up of the equations itself. 
Secondly, the inability to gather infinitely correct data for the 
equations introduced small errors into the computation of 
results. One such incorrect datum is the roundness of the 
billiard balls, as determined by pi. Calculation of the balls' 
roundness are only approximations since the complete value of pi 
cannot be determined (Crutchfield et al., 49). Chaos takes these 
infinitesimally small errors and rapidly magnifies them, 
destroying predictability. 
The infinite sensitivity to errors in chaotic systems makes 
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predictability a hopeless task. This is a major break with the 
traditional Newtonian model, which held that fairly accurate 
predictions would result from fairly accurate data, and has 
forced a reexamination of the deterministic model. G.M.K. Hunt 
has designed a useful dichotomy to show the effects of chaos upon 
this model. In particular, he notes the subdivision of 
epistemically deterministic, or predictable, systems from the 
whole of physically deterministic systems (132). Though they had 
once been considered one and the same, the science of chaos 
demands their separation. 
Furthermore, epistemically deterministic systems seem to be 
the exception rather than the rule, for chaos has been theorized 
to play a role in the paths of the planets and has been 
documented in the unpredictable path of Saturn's moon Hyperion 
(Hartley, 39; "First," 998). At the other end of the spectrum, 
chaos has been seen at the subatomic level, hinting that such 
processes are governed by deterministic means after all 
(Gutzwiller, 78). In between, chaos even has been demonstrated 
in the dripping of a faucet (Crutchfield et al., 55). Chaos 
implies unpredictability from the most basic levels of our 
physical world to the largest. It is also suggestive that chaos 
exists in the physical processes which determine our behavior. 
Along with quantum indeterminacy, chaos provides a second 
blow to the perfectly predictable world envisioned by LaPlace, 
but the impact of chaos is on a much greater scale. The universe 
appears to have many unpredictable secrets which can never be 
Till 30 
known because of chaos. Having established this, some 
theoretical answers to the free will and determinism debate can 
be drawn. 
By showing that unpredictability is intrinsic to 
determinism, chaos answers the criterion that determinism explain 
unpredictability. Behavior that had previously been viewed as 
unpredictable due to a lack of knowledge can now be modelled 
through deterministic means. If chaos plays a role in our 
understanding of behavior then we may will finally be able to 
model the unpredictability of our behavior in a deterministic 
way. We will no longer have to resort to a shrug and a wishy-
washy statement that Newtonian determinism will be able to 
explain behavior "someday." 
Furthermore, the ability to better explain behavior in a 
deterministic fashion hurts the libertarian model. Chaos exists 
in systems which are deterministic, and determinism does not 
allow for free will. By showing that unpredictability can result 
through causal laws, the libertarian argument that determinism 
cannot explain our behavior is lost. The role of chaos in our 
understanding of behavior is of obvious interest to the 
determinists, then, and will be explored in the next section. 
At the same time, chaos could aid the libertarian argument 
by providing the fundamental unpredictability necessary for the 
free will to act without detection. It could do so in one or two 
ways. 
First, the infinite sensitivity to errors in data could 
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enable chaos to be the mechanism to amplify the apparent 
indeterminacy in the brain. It will be recalled that this 
mechanism is necessary for overdetermination to take place. 
"Quantum mechanics implies that initial measurements are always 
uncertain, and chaos ensures that the uncertainties will quickly 
overwhelm the ability to make predictions" (Crutchfield, et al., 
49). Chaos could operate as the tool by which the free will 
impacts brain states. 
Second, even without quantum indeterminacy, chaos may be 
able to create the required unpredictability in brain states. If 
chaos exists in the brain, the determination of brain states as a 
whole could be fundamentally unpredictable. By showing that 
chaos can affect the brain states which determine behavior, the 
possibility of free will is opened. Furthermore, the infinite 
sensitivity to input that is characteristic of chaos could be 
used by the free will to alter brain states. The free will could 
act at a level beyond our ability to analyze and use chaos to 
expand this initial input. 
Dr. Libet's study on the role of conscious will in voluntary 
action is useful in showing how chaos may be used by the free 
will to effect our actions. Libet's study indicated that 
although our initiatives to act begin unconsciously, we do have 
the ability to block these initiatives. The free will could use 
chaos to randomly scatter vetoed potentials for action through 
overdetermination, acting without detection. This would give us 
libertarian or contingent freedom. And of course, the 
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libertarians argue that if the free will is possible it should be 
presumed to exist. 
Attempts to prove these theoretical conclusions take up the 
rest of the paper. In the remainder of this section, a few tools 
with which chaotic systems can be identified are given. These 
tools will be useful in establishing the role of chaos in 
behavior, which will be shown in the next section. 
While chaos shows that even simple deterministic systems can 
act in complex and unpredictable ways, it also provides science 
with the ability to explain seemingly random behavior in simple 
ways. The key to this is that chaos is marked by periods of near 
order intermeshed with times of apparent randomness. (Briggs, 
62). This separates it from truly random behavior, in which no 
order is found. 
An example of this is the weather, the first system shown to 
be chaotic, as done by meteorologist Edward Lorenz in 1961 
(Gleick, 31). While the behavior of the weather never repeats, 
there is order to what is encountered. Certain atmospheric 
conditions often nearly repeat, and this allows for some degree 
of prediction. Even when the weather turns violent, it 
eventually comes back to some sort of stable state, showing how 
order and randomness are woven together within chaos. However, 
long-term predictions are often nothing more than intuition, and 
even short-term predictions can be terribly wrong. 
Identifying a chaotic system is usually not as easy as this 
description might make it sound to be. Often, the output of a 
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system simply appears random, as opposed to chaotic. Random 
systems can be described linearly, and remain theoretically 
predictable. The only difficulty in predicting a random system 
is the large number of variables that have to be included in the 
equation. The dripping of a faucet exemplifies the difficulties 
in telling the two systems apart. The dripping of a faucet often 
appears to be random, but actually is chaotic; that is, there is 
an underlying order behind the appearance of randomness. 
Fortunately, there is a empirical way of identifying chaotic 
systems. 
This method views the output of a system in what is known as 
phase space. Again, the work of Newton was instrumental in the 
development of this dynamical tool. Phase space consists of six 
dimensions; three for the position of an object, three for its 
momentum (Gutzwiller, 80). Phase space best shows the tendency 
of chaotic systems to settle down into periods of relative order. 
Chaotic systems leave a distinguishing signature - a thumbprint, 
in a sense - in diagrams of phase space, known as a chaotic 
attractor (Gleick, 140). Chaotic systems differ from linear 
systems in phase space in that their identifying attractors are 
much more contorted than those of linear systems. Also, chaotic 
attractors carry a self-similarity to infinite levels of 
magnification. This self-similar shape is known as a fractal, 
and is produced in phase space only by chaotic systems (Briggs, 
168). 
The tendency of chaotic systems to act with varying degrees 
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of near order and apparent randomness, combined with the ability 
to establish chaotic attractors, give two ways of identifying 
chaos. These will be of some use in the next section, which will 
provide the material necessary to bridge the river between the 
theoretical conclusions sketched out in this section and their 
actual relevance to human behavior. 
IV. Evidence of Chaos in Behavior 
The mathematical model of chaos has shown the weaknesses of 
the predictable, deterministic model envisioned by Laplace, which 
our behavior is still largely modeled by. Nevertheless, this 
does not necessarily mean that chaos plays a role in our 
understanding of behavior. It is a big jump to connect our 
behavior to the mathematical model of chaos, and if there is a 
link between the two, it must be established. 
Even if chaos does work here, it may be limited in scope and 
allow our behavior to still be theoretically predictable. This 
section will attempt to back up the theoretical conclusions of 
the last section by searching for evidence as to what role chaos 
plays in our understanding of behavior. This will allow final 
conclusions to be drawn in the next section. 
Evidence of chaos in behavior will be sought at two levels. 
Chaos in the action of individuals within groups, or chaos in 
social systems, will be referred to as the macroscopic study of 
chaos in behavior. At the other end of the spectrum, at the 
microscopic level, the role of chaos in the determination of 
brain states that cause our behavior will be examined. The role 
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that chaos can be expected to play at both of these levels can be 
seen by reviewing the model of chaotic billiards. 
At the macroscopic leve1, the action of the billiard balls 
can be compared to the action of groups of individuals. As that 
model shows, even the smallest of errors in quantification leads 
to inaccurate predictions, even though the laws that govern the 
action of the balls are known. The path of even one ball cannot 
be predicted without knowing the potential behavior of everything 
which may act upon it, which is impossible in a chaotic system. 
In social systems, which are less quantifiable and more 
complex than a simple billiards table, the problem is only 
magnified. Even if the laws by which our behavior are guided by 
are known, small errors in quantifying the data to solve for 
these equations would explode and cause unpredictability. The 
role of chaos indicates that the prediction of our behavior is 
theoretically impossible and that only possible trends and 
tendencies can be identified. 
How do the macroscopic studies fit into the theoretical 
conclusions of the last section? By establishing chaos at the 
macroscopic level, unpredictability could be explained entirely 
through causal laws. This would aid the determinists by giving a 
deterministic explanation to what previously could not be 
explained causally. On the other hand, this unpredictability 
does not seem to significantly aid the libertarians because it is 
limited to the action of groups. Macroscopic unpredictability 
does not seem to give the individual freedom of contingency since 
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it exists only at the level of the group and does not seem to 
extend to the fundamental level of brain states, where the 
processes which determine an individual's behavior take place. 
The macroscopic study of behavior would aid the determinists 
more than the libertarians, but microscopic studies of chaos in 
brain states provide another way of explaining unpredictability 
in behavior that is more beneficial to the libertarian cause. If 
chaos works in the brain, it may make the brain states which 
determine behavior as unpredictable as the chaotic billiard 
table. In so doing, it could push unpredictability of behavior 
to the most fundamental levels that science could hope to 
examine. 
This would provide exactly the kind of fundamental 
unpredictability in the brain that the libertarians seek to allow 
for the possibility of overdetermination, and would represent a 
substantial improvement in their model. At the same time, 
however, the determinists would also be helped by providing them 
with another causal explanation to unpredictable behavior. 
Having established the general ways that chaos may act at 
each of the two levels and the importance of each, evidence of 
chaos can now be cited. I will begin with the macroscopic 
studies, where some work has been done linking chaos and our 
behavior. For instance, David Loye and Riane Eisler of the 
Institute for Futures Forecasting in Carmel, California, note 
that chaos may fit the goals of general systems theory and 
appears to be a transdisciplinary tool which can be applied to 
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social systems (55). 
Evidence of the transdisciplinary nature of chaos is seen in 
the headway that it has made in economic theory, foreign policy, 
and even literature, among other fields of study (Rosser, 268; 
Murray et al., 1869; Hayles, 305). It also hints that chaos can 
be applied to the microscopic discipline of neurobiological 
determinism, which will be dealt with a little later. 
The likely existence of chaos in social systems has been 
noticed by many scientists, who argue that it presents an 
absolute barrier to prediction. The extent of the problem is 
summed up by Ian Stewart in Does God Play Dice?, as he quotes a 
previous statement he made in conjunction with Tim Poston. 
Noting Poincare's work on the impossibility of the three-body 
problem, Stewart writ~s, "So the 'inexorable laws of physics' on 
which - for instance - Marx tried to model his laws of history, 
were never really there. If Newton could not predict the 
behaviour of three balls, how could Marx predict that of three 
people?" (40) . 5 
Other scientists make similar pronouncements. Herbert A. 
Simon of Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh bluntly states 
that chaos means that "we must give up prediction as the primary 
goal of modeling" within social systems (Simon, 8). Also, Dr. 
Hendon Chubb, Director of the Brief Therapy Institute in West 
Cornwall, Connecticut, spells out his belief that control of 
5Stewart quotes himself and Poston from Analog, Nov. 1981. 
Since he is quoting himself, I have not included Analog in the 
list of works cited. 
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behavior is impossible because of the chaotic nature of social 
systems. Unfortunately, he provides no empirical evidence to 
back this up, except for the unstated evidence that therapists 
are not now able to predict behavior with reliability {Chubb, 
174) . 
More substantial proof of unpredictability comes from a 
study undertaken by Dr. Diana Richards of Yale University. As an 
indication of how recent a discovery chaos is, Dr. Richards 
points to her 1990 study as the first empirical and experimental 
examination of how well chaos works as a model in the social 
sciences (Richards, 213). The study analyzed the interdependent 
decision making habits of individuals, where the decision of one 
individual can affect the decision of another. The sample size 
was small, as only eight subjects were involved in the study. 
Nonetheless, of these eight, six exhibited behavior that was 
described as chaotic in an experimental test known as the 
prisoner's dilemma (Richards, 232). Because these actions are 
chaotic, the results of Dr. Richard's study mirror the conclusion 
of Dr. Chubb that behavior is unpredictable. 
The examples cited above are indicative of the small but 
growing theoretical and experimental evidence showing that chaos 
works to prevent the predictability of behavior at the 
macroscopic level. The evidence also backs up the tentative 
conclusions mentioned earlier that it advances the determinist 
argument while not doing so with the libertarian. 
However, there is another way of explaining how chaos may 
Till 39 
create unpredictability in behavior, and that is by looking to 
the microscopic studies of chaos in the determination of the 
brain states which cause our behavior. The link between chaos 
and behavior is more difficult to establish here, since there is 
no model yet that gives a thorough description of the workings of 
the brain. 
Nonetheless, recent research into the role of chaos promises 
to expand our general understanding of what we do know about the 
brain, and shows that chaos seems to play a role in the 
determination of behavior. To establish this, the role of chaos 
in brain states will be traced from the most general hints of its 
existence in the brain to more specific explanations of how it 
works there. 
One concrete indication that chaos exists in the brain is 
that the normal pattern of electrical behavior in the brain 
appears to be chaotic (Taubes, 65). This means that there is a 
hidden order in data that had been perceived to be random "noise" 
(Skarda and Freeman, 165) Furthermore, the failure of the brain 
waves to remain consistently chaotic has severe consequences, 
since evidence suggests that electrical patterns become regular 
during epileptic seizures (Skarda and Freeman, 189). This 
mirrors evidence which shows that the heartbeat is normally 
chaotic, and that heart attacks are often preceded by a regular 
heartbeat (Goldberger, 47). 
Another indication of chaos in the brain comes from Arnold 
Mandell, a San Diego psychiatrist and dynamicist who claims to 
Till 40 
have uncovered chaos in the action of chemicals in the brain 
(Gleick, 298). Mandell argues that this is but a part of the 
larger impact of chaos in our lives, which could extend even to 
our personalities, a claim that will be dealt with later in this 
section (Briggs, 168). 
The likely existence of chaos in the brain causes the task 
to turn to discovering what role it plays in the determination of 
our actions. Some interesting work in this direction comes from 
physicist Gottfried Mayer-Kress and his students at the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory's Center for Nonlinear Studies. They 
have developed a mathematical model of how changes in brain 
patterns are related to changes in behavior (Alper, 21). Their 
work shows a link between the two, and importantly, that the 
changes in brain patterns take place chaotically. Because the 
patterns are chaotic, this is evidence that the behavioral states 
they correspond to are unpredictable. However, the study does 
not show if chaos actually helps determine future behavioral 
states or if it is merely a by-product of the brain's activity. 
Research to prove the former will now be given. 
One indication that chaos is intrinsic to the operation of 
the brain is given by Ors. Don Walter and Alan Garfinkel of 
University of California at Los Angeles. They devised a model 
which linked three neurons together and found that the neurons 
acted chaotically (Briggs, 167). The implications of this are 
daunting. The average brain consists of 10 11 neurons, with 104 
synapses each, for a total of 1015 connections. This is roughly 
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equal to the number of stars in the Milky Way Galaxy, and the 
connections are different with every person (Bridgemann, 57). If 
chaos exists here, predictability of brain states would seem to 
be a staggering impossibility. 
Still, this is just a simple computer model, and it only 
gives the most general of information concerning the role of 
chaos in the brain. More informative studies on how chaos 
operates in the brain have been done by neurophysiologists Walter 
J. Freeman of the University of California at Berkeley and 
Christine A. Skarda of the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris. They 
have developed a theory of how the brain generates and uses 
chaos, and this makes their work important to any discussion of 
how chaos may effect the brain states which determine our 
actions. 
Skarda and Freeman claim that the chaos is essential to the 
functioning of the brain. They discovered evidence indicating 
that chaos plays an important role in the way information is 
transmitted, stored, and recalled by the brain. Freeman suggests 
that the brain uses chaos to generate insight and creativity, and 
is necessary in the determination of our consciousness. By 
demonstrating that chaos may deeply permeate the way that the 
brain works, Skarda and Freeman show that chaos is critical to 
the creation of the brain states which bring about our actions. 
In doing so, this also indicates that chaos plays an important 
role in making these brain states unpredictable. 
Skarda and Freeman focused their work on the function of 
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perception. In particular, their studies concentrated on the 
olfactory system of rabbits. They analyzed this system because 
it is one of the brain's most well-understood systems (Skarda and 
Freeman, 162). Importantly, they note that they have discovered 
chaos not only in this system but throughout the brain. As a 
result, Freeman believes that lessons gained from the study of 
the olfactory system are applicable to other parts of the brain 
(Freeman, 85), and so their work will be given special treatment. 
The researchers understood that even a small input from 
scents detected by neurons in the nasal passages could have a 
dramatic effect on the output of brain waves in the olfactory 
system, and they recognized this output to be chaotic. "Chaos is 
evident in the tendency of vast collections of neurons to shift 
abruptly and simultaneously from one complex activity pattern to 
another in response to the smallest of inputs" (Freeman, 78). 
Skarda and Freeman believe that this chaos arises through a 
process of feedback (Skarda and Freeman, 171). Freeman argues 
that chaos can arise in the brain when two or more of its parts 
are communicating with one another over the same input signal but 
cannot agree on a common message between them (Freeman, 85). 
This causes the neurons in each part to become more excited and 
leads to further communication between the two halves. This 
process of feedback is characteristic of chaos. 
Evidence for feedback is seen in that the chaos in the 
olfactory system stopped when the two parts of the system were 
experimentally disconnected by the researchers (Freeman, 85). 
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Furthermore, other researchers have established this kind of 
feedback between parts of the brain used in memory (Miskin and 
Appenzeller, 85). The discovery that feedback between parts of 
the brain leads to chaos is noteworthy because decision-making 
involves many parts of the brain (Bridgemann, 415; Cami, 277). 
This suggests that the brain states which determine our actions 
are themselves chaotic. 
Furthermore, the brain seems designed to have a constant 
amount of chaos operating within it. In the olfactory system, 
the original signal from the nasal neurons is muted to remove 
unnecessary information as it moves between the two parts, 
meaning that each gets a different message. This insures 
disagreement over the message, generating chaos, while at the 
same time keeping chaos within certain broad boundaries (Skarda 
and Freeman, 168). Failure to keep chaos under control may cause 
the brain to force itself into a regular pattern of electrical 
activity - possibly leading to an epileptic seizure (Skarda and 
Freeman, 168). The ability to explain brain events outside of 
the sense of smell furthers Freeman's claim that chaos exists 
throughout the brain. 
Other research which took place after Skarda and Freeman 
published their work has shown that it is possible to control a 
chaotic system in this way if the control is constantly pursued 
(Peterson, 60). Furthermore, the researchers who took part in 
this independent research claim that controlled chaos appears to 
be a "necessary ingredient" to the operation of the brain 
Till 44 
(Peterson, 61}. This separate research adds weight to the claims 
of Skarda and Freeman and shows that chaos may play a role in the 
creation of brain states which determine behavior. 
Further evidence of the chaotic nature of brain waves is 
shown by the researchers' ability to display their data of brain 
waves in the form of a chaotic attractor. In the olfactory 
system, this attractor develops when the miscommunication between 
parts of the system begins to settle down after it is held under 
the influence of a scent for a short time (Freeman, 84). It will 
be recalled from the previous section that chaotic systems do 
tend to settle down into periods of relative order. Again, this 
is strong evidence that chaos does influence brain states. 
Each chaotic attractor represents the firing of particular 
groups of neurons in the olfactory system and its shape changed 
with each new scent that the olfactory system was exposed to 
(Freeman, 84). The fact that a chaotic attractor has been 
uncovered is highly indicative that the brain uses chaos to help 
make sense of the data it receives (Skarda and Freeman, 168). In 
playing a determining role in the process of perception, chaos 
influences the data upon which our decisions are based. 
The researchers theorize that this chaotic attractor plays a 
role in how the brain learns, as well. Chaotic attractors 
represent the pattern of the firing of particular groups of 
neurons. When a scent causes a particular group of neurons to 
fire, the connections between the neurons which represent the 
attractor are strengthened, and they begin to work as one in what 
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the researchers refer to as a nerve cell assembly. These nerve 
cell assemblies are essential to the way that scents are learned 
by the olfactory system (Skarda and Freeman, 168). When a scent 
is detected and the olfactory system is alerted, these nerve cell 
assemblies allow instant recognition of familiar scents (Freeman, 
68). In this way, chaos plays a role in how the brain makes 
interprets the information the senses present it and determines 
how this information is stored. 
This is apparent from reading Skarda and Freeman, but 
perhaps a more convincing source is Bruce Bridgemann, a 
neurobiologist from the University of Bielfeld, Germany, who 
seems to have been unaware of the work of the two researchers on 
chaos and the brain. In Bridgemann's attempt to describe the way 
neurons link up, he states that "the determination of a 
biological nerve network is not deterministic, but neither is it 
random. Rather, it seems to be a kind of messy, flexible 
determinism, governed by organizing principles but not completely 
specified by them" (Bridgemann, 402). This description agrees 
with how a chaotically determined system might appear to an 
uninitiated observer. 
Furthermore, the chaotic attractors representing different 
nerve cell assemblies all change when a unique scent is .detected 
by the olfactory system for the first time. The evidence that 
these "memory maps" are capable of changing agrees with the 
ability of stroke patients to relearn functions that previously 
had been located in the damaged areas of the brain. Chaos makes 
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the brain states which determine our behavior unpredictable by 
influencing the way that the information necessary for decisions 
is sensed and learned. 
Importantly, the power of chaos in the brain is not limited 
to merely our interpretation of the external world but helps us 
look inward as well, since Freeman also suggests that chaos may 
be the key to our creativity. He notes that chaos is constantly 
able to produce new activity patterns, and the harnessing of this 
by the brain would allow for ingenuity and imagination (Freeman, 
85). The ability of the brain to develop unique thoughts is 
critical for decision-making and behavior, and chaos may give us 
the ability to do this. 
Freeman goes as far as to say that our consciousness itself 
may be the result of these chaotic processes (85), echoing the 
words of Mandell that chaos may create our personalities. If so, 
chaos gives an explanation for the fact that while our behavior 
may be unpredictable, we act with enough order that we can define 
individual character traits. The combination of unpredictability 
and order is seen in all chaotic systems. Indeed, if chaos is 
essential in giving rise to our consciousness, then it can play a 
role in determining our actions. To quote psychologist David 
Oakley, "Consciousness can be involved in the control of behavior 
at the level of the individual action and at the more molar level 
of the plan" (Oakley, 69). 
The evidence shows that chaos could play a role in the 
determination of our actions, which means that those actions and 
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the brain states which determine them are unpredictable. Chaos 
has been seen in the way in which we make sense of the world and 
in how tpis information is stored, and has been suggested as the 
source of our creativity and consciousness. Decision-making is a 
process which requires all of these functions. Chaos in any of 
these functions would probably make prediction impossible, so 
this thoroughly chaotic theory of the brain suggests enormous 
unpredictable complexity in the physical processes which 
determine our behavior. 
Taken together, the macroscopic and microscopic studies seem 
to indicate that our behavior is steeped in chaos. It shows that 
our actions may be fundamentally unpredictable but also suggests 
that this unpredictability arises through a deterministic 
process. In so doing, this section provides evidence to back up 
the claims made earlier about how chaos may be used to back both 
the deterministic and libertarian arguments. A more thorough 
discussion of this is now forthcoming. 
V. Conclusions 
The evidence given in the preceding section indicates that 
chaos plays a role in behavior at both the macroscopic and 
microscopic levels. The existence of chaos in behavior allows 
conclusions to be drawn which I believe endorse the purpose of 
this paper, which was to "demonstrate that while chaos improves 
the case for determinism, it also shows that free will might be 
possible in a world that otherwise appears to be governed by 
universal efficient causality." The criteria established earlier 
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will now be brought into play to establish my final conclusions 
for both the deterministic and libertarian arguments. 
The criterion for advancing determinism, it will be 
recalled, was to develop an explanation for the unpredictability 
that we see in behavior. Previously, such unpredictability was 
claimed to be due simply to a lack of knowledge about behavior, 
but this left open to the libertarians the possibility that 
behavior is unpredictable because of free will. The role of 
chaos in establishing unpredictability as part of determinism 
holds the key to fulfilling this criterion and providing a basis 
for rejecting the libertarian claim. 
Chaos explains the unpredictability of behavior in a 
thoroughly deterministic fashion. The separation of epistemic 
determinism from physical determinism demands that unpredictable 
events will occur. Theoretically, this assists determinism in 
that by showing that unpredictable events can take place within 
that model, eliminating the need for a free will. These 
theoretical conclusions are supported by the evidence which shows 
that chaos is not just a mathematical model but one that actually 
can be applied to our behavior. 
The evidence of chaos at the macroscopic level alone is 
enough to prove the criterion for determinism. Chaos at the 
level of social systems implies that behavior is unpredictable, 
thus repelling the challenge of the libertarians. The evidence 
of chaos at the microscopic level goes even further and shows 
that a new understanding of the deterministic brain may be called 
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for. 
The chaos-laden workings of the brain shows that chaos plays 
many roles in the determination of our actions. Chaos effects 
the way that we unconsciously see the world and what information 
we draw from it. It may also give the brain the ability to look 
ahead to see the consequences of particular actions and to learn 
from those mental trial-and-error patterns. Chaos may even 
provide us with the consciousness necessary for decision-making. 
Chaos provides determinism with a new way of viewing 
unpredictability that previously it could not explain. 
Even the libertarian claim based upon indeterminacy is 
attacked, because chaos seems to exist at the quantum level, 
hinting that the indeterminant events which take place at that 
level are in fact determined. All this evidence is useful for 
the deterministic argument, but in particular I believe it is 
especially strengthens the compatibilist argument. The 
philosophical impact of chaos on determinism can now be outlined. 
First, chaos implies that we have no knowable fate. In this 
sense, we are free, since the decisions we make and the reasons 
for those decisions are our own. No one can entirely predict our 
actions, and no one can ever have absolute control over us. 
There are no Shakespearian witches with the power to see into the 
future and against whose prophesies we vainly struggle in 
attempts to change inevitable fate. Because of the difficulties 
with prediction of behavior, our future remains in some sense 
"open," as it forever hidden from us. 
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Second, if my actions are not ultimately free, the chaos-
laden image of the brain shows that the reasons for this are so 
far removed from my life that they cease to be relevant. The 
microscopic studies of the brain show that even if our behavior 
is determined entirely by efficient causality, this process is so 
remarkably complex and unpredictable that it seems impossible for 
anyone to get to the bottom of it. If the truth is that we are 
governed by mechanical laws, I can live with and still believe 
myself free. 
This is a central tenet of compatibilism, as mentioned 
earlier. Causality is not a category that applies to immediate 
experience and the chaotic model of determinism makes causality 
an even more difficult tiger to take by the tail, for even when 
causal laws can be established, it does not follow that 
predictability will result. The link between cause and effect 
can only be determined in retrospect, if then. Arguably, this 
destroys the contradiction between determinism and freedom and 
deflates much criticism of the compatibilist argument. 
Chaos strengthens determinism by showing that the 
unpredictability of behavior is not a failure o{ the model but is 
rather an intrinsic part of it. However, though it improves the 
deterministic argument, chaos does so at the cost of meeting the 
criterion for the improvement of the libertarian argument as 
well. The contribution of chaos to the libertarian argument will 
now be summarized. 
The steps for meeting the libertarian criterion are a little 
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less manifest than they are for determinism. The libertarians 
begin by attacking the idea that determinism is an ultimate 
truth; instead, they argue that it is a conventional truth, one 
which cannot disprove the possibility of free will. However, 
this does not explain how the free will can be made to agree with 
a world which appears to be governed by universal causality. 
Accordingly, the criterion for improving the libertarian 
model was to prove that the belief in universal causality could 
be circumvented without breaking its appearance. Furthermore, 
this must be shown to be possible at the level of the brain 
states which determine an individual's behavior, in accordance 
with neurophysiological determinism. 
By separating epistemic determinism from physical 
determinism, chaos shows that brain states can be fundamentally 
unpredictable. It may also be the tool that the free will uses 
in vetoing potentials for action, since an unmeasurable influence 
by the free will could theoretically be blown up by chaos, 
impacting brain states. This has been referred to as a theory of 
overdetermination or the Epicurean Swerve. Dr. Libet's study 
completes the model by showing that this disruption of brain 
states could be the key to the action of the free will, as it 
vetoes potentials for action. The evidence indicating that chaos 
is deeply involved in the operation of the brain backs these 
conclusions. 
The science of chaos does apparently meet the criterion set 
down for the advancement of the libertarian argument. We turn 
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now to see how this may affect the philosophical debate, and the 
implications are clear. 
Since chaos seems to allow the possibility of free will, 
many argue that its existence should be presumed. After all, 
attempts to prove the free will can only be shown not to break 
the laws of universal causality, and in this the libertarians can 
claim success. Consequently, the libertarians can argue that it 
is the determinists who have been defeated, not they. As a 
conventional truth, the libertarians argue that belief in free 
will is arguably more useful than any deterministic definition in 
breaking the supposed contradiction between freedom and 
determinism and also better fits our traditional definition of 
freedom. Therefore, its existence should simply be presumed • . 
This is the essential difference between the deterministic 
and libertarian arguments. Whereas the determinists can claim 
that chaos makes the free will unnecessary, the libertarians 
claim that chaos makes it possible and therefore necessary. In a 
sense, both are right, but are looking at it from different 
perspectives. Scientifically, the idea of free will adds nothing 
to our understanding of behavior, and the determinists can claim 
that chaos explains the unpredictability of behavior in a 
deterministic fashion. Since it adds nothing scientifically, our 
philosophical model should be adjusted. 
On the other hand, the idea of free will does seem to add 
something to our understanding of morality and therefore the 
libertarians argue that the determinists must expand their model 
Till 53 
to include the causality of a free will. Furthermore, while 
chaos allows for a deterministic explanation of behavior, it also 
opens the possibility of free will. Since it is possible, the 
libertarians argue that free will is necessary and should be 
taken on faith until proven otherwise, which chaos implies cannot 
happen. 
It has been seen that chaos opens new avenues for 
exploration in the free will debate. By separating epistemic 
determinism from physical determinism, chaos shows that it can 
explain the unpredictability of determinism while accommodating 
the need for libertarianism to get around universal causality. 
This must be seen as a victory for the libertarians, since 
science has traditionally not even allowed the possibility of 
their view, but the determinists have had their argument 
strengthened as well. 
The argument over libertarianism and determinism is ancient, 
and perhaps this paper is just more evidence as to why it has 
been so difficult to come to any generally accepted conclusions 
favoring one argument over the other. By showing that neither 
side of the debate can be defeated on empirical evidence, the 
battle over free will and determinism may well be decided on the 
periphery, on theoretical arguments over the truth of efficient 
causation and on the purpose and form of science, for instance, 
or perhaps on specific versions of free will, which are not dealt 
with here. 
Finally, I will allow that my conclusions are tentative for 
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lack of research on the relationship between chaos and behavior. 
Nonetheless, I believe that as the amount of information on chaos 
grows it will be used by both determinists and libertarians alike 
to justify their claims, but it will also insure that the 
opposing viewpoint cannot be defeated. 
Till 55 
WORKS CITED 
Alper, Joseph. "The chaotic brain: new models of behavior." 
Psychology Today May 1989: 21. 
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von. General Systems Theory. New York: 
George Braziller, 1968. 
Bridgemann, Bruce. The Biology of Behavior and Mind. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1988. 
Briggs, John, and F. David Peat. The Turbulent Mirror. New 
York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1968. 
Cami, Jeffrey M. Neuroethology. Sunderland, Massachusetts: 
Sinaur Associates, Inc., 1984. 
Chubb, Hendon. "Looking at systems as process." Family Process 
29 ( 1990) : 169-175. 
Crutchfield, James P., J. Doyne Farmer, Norman H. Packard, and 
Roberts. Shaw. "Chaos." Scientific American Dec. 1986: 
46-57. 
Darrow, Clarence. Crime: Its Cause and Treatment. 1922. 
London: Watts & Co., 1934. 
Ekeland, Ivar. Mathematics and the Unexpected. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988. 
Eysenck, Hans J. and Michael. Mindwatching. Garden City, New 
York: Anchor Press/Doubleday and Co., 1983. 
"First direct view of solar system chaos.'' Science 24 Nov. 1989: 
998-999. 
Freeman, Walter J. "The physiology of perception." Scientific 
American Feb. 1991: 78-85. 
Till 56 
Gleick, James. Chaos. New York: Penguin Books, 1987. 
Goldberger, Ary L., David R. Rigney, and Bruce J. West. "Chaos 
and Fractals in human physiology." Scientific American Feb. 
1990: 42-49. 
Gutzwiller, Martin c. "Quantum chaos." Scientific American Jan. 
1992: 78-84. 
Hartley, Karen. "Solar system chaos." Astronomy May 1990: 34-
39. 
Hayles, Katherine. "Chaos as orderly disorder: shifting ground 
in contemporary literature and science." New Literary 
History 20 (1989): 305-322. 
Holbach, P.H.T. Baron d'. The System of Nature. Trans. H.D. 
Robinson. 2 vols. 1868. New York: Burt Franklin, 1970. 
Honderich, Ted. "One determinism." Essays on Freedom of Action. 
Ed. Ted Honderich. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. 
185-215. 
Hunt, G.M.K. ''Determinism, predictability, and chaos." Analysis 
June 1987: 129-133. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Kant Selections. Ed. 
Lewis White Beck. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1988. Page numbers refer to A - first edition, and B -
second edition of Kant's work. 
Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. 1929. 
London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1973. Page numbers refer 
to A - first edition, and B - second edition of Kant's work. 
This translation used only once, in long quote pp. 15-16 of 
Till 57 
text. 
Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals. Kant Selections. 
Ed. Lewis White Beck. New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company, 1988. Page numbers refer to Royal Prussian Academy 
of Science edition, 1902-1912. 
On the Form and Principle of the Sensible and Intelligible 
World. Kant Selections. Ed. Lewis White Beck. New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988. Page numbers refer to 
Royal Prussian Academy of Science edition, 1902-1912. 
Kenny, Anthony. Will. Freedom, and Power. New York: Basil 
Blackwell, 1976. 
Kuhn, Thomas s. The Essential Tension. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977. 
LaPlace, Pierre Simon Marquis de. A Philosophical Essay on 
Probabilities. Trans. Frederick Wilson Truscott and 
Frederick Lincoln Emory. New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 1951. 
Libet, Benjamin. "Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role 
of conscious will in voluntary action.'' The Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 8 (1985): 529-567. 
Loye, David, and Riane Eisler. "Chaos and transformation: 
implications of nonequilibrium theory for social science and 
society." Behavioral Science 32 (1987): 53-65. 
Lucretius. De Rerum Natura. Trans. W.H.D. Rouse. 2nd Ed. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975. 
Miskin, Mortimer, and Tim Appenzeller. "The anatomy of memory." 
Till 58 
Scientific American June 1987: 80-89. 
Murray, Frank, Ramazan Gencay, and Thanasis Stengos. 
"International chaos?" European Economic Review Oct. 1988: 
1969-84. 
Oakley, David A., ed. Brain and Mind. New York: Menthuen, 1985. 
Peterson, !vars. "Ribbon of chaos." Science News 26 Jan. 1991: 
60-61. 
Pojman, Louis P. "Freedom and determinism: a contemporary 
discussion." Zygon 22 (1987): 397-417. 
Pool, Robert. "Quantum chaos: enigma wrapped in a mystery." 
Science Feb. 1989: 893-895. 
Richards, Diana. "Is strategic decision making chaotic?" 
Behavioral Science 35 (1990): 219-232. 
Rosser, J. Barkley. "Chaos theory and the new Keynesian 
economics." The Manchester School of Economic and Social 
studies Sept. 1990: 269-291. 
Scott, George P. Atoms of the Living Flame. Lanham, Missouri: 
University Press of America, 1985. 
Sidertis, Mark. "Beyond compatibilism: a Buddhist approach to 
freedom and compatibilism. 11 American Philosophical 
Quarterly 24 (1987): 149-159. 
Simon, Herbert A. "Prediction and prescription in systems 
modeling." Operations Research Jan.-Feb. 1990: 7-15. 
Skarda, Christine A., and Walter J. Freeman. "How brains make 
chaos in order to make sense of the world." The Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 10 (1987): 161-195. 
Till 59 
Stewart, Ian. Does God Play Dice?. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989. 
Taubes, Gary. "The body chaotic." Discover. May 1989: 62-67. 
Thorp, John. Free Will: A Defence Against Neurophysiological 
Determinism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. 
Wright, Georg Henrik von. Causality and Determinism. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1974. 
